INTRODUCTION
c< .
. .
The extensive game model is of fundamental importance and captures
the interplay between information and decision-making. Yet we find that its definition, as set forth by Kuhn in 1S], is insufficient from certain points of view. It is unable to incorporate games with a continuum of players. Also it often makes for an unnaturally complex representation.
For instance, a game in which n players move simultaneously can be described in the Kuhn framework. But first we would have to order the players artificially and then have them move in sequence with suitably enlarged information sets. If we try to carry this out when n is not finite but a continuum, the difficult), of the procedure becomes clear.
Therefore we are led to develop a variant model which has the feature that several players can move simultaneously at any position in the game.
Games of the type in [5] are, of course, included as a special case of our set-up.
In Section 2 we develop our model and illustrate it with an example. In the rest of the paper, we focus on the effect on Nash Equilibria (N.E.) that is caused solely by changes in the information pattern of an extensive game. In Section 3 we show that if information is refined, without increasing players' knowledge about chance moves,then the N.E.'s of the coarse game do not disappear. But the converse is not true: in general there is a rapid proliferation of new N.E.'s.
In the next section, Section 4, we explore conditions under which this proliferation is arrested. The notion of "no informational influence" is introduced. It says that if a single player unilaterally changes his strategy, then the resultant new outcome tree does not pass through any other information set of the remaining players than the old one did.
This is a purely set-theoretic condition and can hold not only in nonatomic, but also in finite, games--see the examples in Section 4. We prove that if it holds then a Nash outcome of the refined game is also that of its coarse form, i.e., is not a "new" N.E. brought about by the increased strategic (threat) possibilities. When we turn to non-atomic games, no informational influence holds in full force and we get: Nash outcomes are invariant of the information pattern (see Section 5) . This leads to the "Anti-folk Theorem" in Section 6: the N.E.'s of a repeated game are precisely those which are N.E.'s in each stage. 0 0 then x is an ending position of the game. It will be convenient to partition X into the three sets:
EXTENSIVE GAMES IN SIMULTANEOUS MOVE
:~~ x= -{xC EX : u(x)--) (Note that X c and X E may be empty.)
is a set of functions from r(x) to some x a x x x set Y . We assume tnat r(x) =0...S = 0
Given sX E S t E yx and i E v(x) , denote by (s Xi, t) the function from "(x) to Yx which assigns t to i , and agrees with s elsewhere. Also let sx stand for sX(i) . Our assumption on S x is:
Define S x = {sx : s E S } for i E n(x) . Note that, by (2.2), (vii) A union of plays A = U p is said to be an outcome tree (or, aacE more simply, an outcome) if
The set of all outcomes depends upon the five-tuple r (N, X, r, {S xEX' 0) and will be denoted A(r ) Each h. is simply a real-valued function on A(r) and gives the we will say that " y follows from v via the move t of player i ," and denote this by (v,t) -< y . The perfect recall assumption may now be i stated:
It says that at any position each player can fully recall the entire history of his previous information and moves. Technically we need only the weaker condition (2.7), though we feel that it is more natural to postulate perfect recall. Indeed when we restrict ourselves in Section 7 to behavioral--rather than mixed--strategies, then (2.8) is implicitly assumed. For then, by Kuhn's theorem in [5] , behavioral strategies suffice for the analysis of N.E.'s.
An Example
Consider: 
The tree of this game is:
, 6 j are the moves of players o. from X. to U S x which satisfy
Thus we can also think of a. as a map a. : I. -. U " • and, with-.
xEx.
1-1
x .1 out confusion, a. will be used in both senses. Given a strategy-choice o = {aii. , where each a. E Z (r) , abbreviate {a(x)i.
Let z(r) be the set of all feasible strategy-choices in r . We assume throughout that z(r) is not empty (see Remark 2) . Define the in E(r) , and therefore our next definition makes sense. T
1-ategy-
choice a E z(r) is called a Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) of r ii, Zor
The outcome C(o) produced by an N.E. a of r will be called a Nash outcome of r Remarks.
(2) If N is finite then, by (2.4), it follows that Z(r) is non-empty. But in our general set-up we have made no connection between the information sets and the feasibility condition (2.9), so it is not possible to deduce that Z(r) is non-empty. We find it more economical * .. to assume non-emptiness here rather than to seek the extra conditions that will imply it.
PRESERVATION OF NASH OUTCOMES
We will focus on the effect on Nash outcomes that is caused solelV by changes in the information pattern of the extensive game. For this purpose we take a pair of games r , I* which are identical except for their information patterns {I0} *} Our sharpest result i iEN 'i iEN * u hretrsl is in the case when N is finite, though many of its corollaries continue to hold in general. We therefore break up this section into two parts.
The Finite-Player Case
For simplicity, denote I(r) , Z(r) (r*) , Z(r*) by
For a E Z , define:
for some Tj E Zj and j E N"-{i} 
Ii ( Proposition will now follow from
Step 2. For any r* in Z* there exists a T. in Z. such that
We claim that for any x, y E &*(o*I T) . .. .
x 0 x
We shall establish (3.5) and (3.6) by induction. If
say that the length of x from x 0 is R+1 . Put: X = {x E X : the length of x from x 0 is < 2)
Denote by (3.5) (3.6) the statements (3.5), (3.6) but with X. ( a is any strategy-choice that leads to the marked play &(c) and T1 P T2 range over all strategies of players 1, 2.)
It can now easily be checked that (iii)(a), (iii)(b) hold for r . o
Thus if E(o) is Nash in r , it will also be Nash in Thus (iii)(b) says that there is no informational gain regarding chance moves in going from r to r* at a . However, this needs to be true for player i only under his own unilateral deviations. r -i r* -(iii)(a) automatically holds.
We can think of (iii)(a) as a weakening of r-i r* . It requires that, in the region reached by others' unilateral deviations, there is no informational loss in going from r to r* at a (5) The scope of Proposition I will become clear later since many of the propositions that follow will be its simple corollaries when N is finite. Let us point out one such immediately. For any game r let n(r) denote the set of all its Nash outcomes. They, by (3.9) and One would need to make more measurabilitytype assumptions on the structure of the game to overcome this difficultn.
For instance consider:
Here d is an algebra of subsets of N which includes all singleton sets. Also require: Possibly (**) can be deduced from more elementary assumptions on the tree, though we have not explored this.
Nestedness of Nash Equilibria under Refinement
We now prove (3.11) without the assumption that N is finite.
First note that if r -3 r* there is a natural sense in which 
Q.E.D.
As an immediate corollary we get a global version of Proposition 2.1: 
DW(a*) = D.(*IIT*) for all "* E "
Then we will say that i has strictly no informational influence on j . In the non-atomic case (Section 5, Lemma 2) it is in fact (4.2)* that obtains.
NON-ATOMIC GAMES

The Definition
For simplicity we will assume, throughout Section 5, that there are no chance moves. (The) will be incorporated in Remark 9.) We need to specialize the set-theoretic structure of r to treat non-atomic games. The player-set N is now equipped with a non-atomic measure.
Precisely, we have a measure space {N,B,V) . B is an a-field of " subsets of N which includes the singleton sets {i} , i E N ;I is a non-atomic probability measure on {N,B} . Each YX (for x E XN )
is also assumed to be a measurable space. We now add the following conditions on the ce#Stft e.nt6 of r , over and above those in Section 2.1,
(i)-(viii).
(ix) For any x E XN , 7(x) is a non-null set in B (xi) For any x, y E XN , the set {i E N y E Ii(x)) is measurable.
These conditions are fairly innocuous. The sine qua non of the non-atomic assumption is in the next, and final, condition. It says that null sets of players and their moves cannot be observed by an) of the others. 
S E B is called null if i(S)
Invariance of Nash Plays on Information Patterns
We will establish that if (i)-(xii) hold for a game, then the N:tsh plays are invariant of the information pattern that the game is endowed with.
We prepare for this with 
is measurable. Therefore, by (xi), so is
Let be any element of Z(r) (which is non-emnty by assumption) and now define a on XN by:
. s. if x E U and i E y (x) for some 2 > 0
Since {y (x) : k = 0, 1, ... ) are disjoint, this a is well-defined.
It can be checked (inductively, starting at x 0 ) that (a) = p Then, by (xii), For any i 1
It remains to verify that a E Z(r)
Since each of the last two sets is measurable, so is the first, and thus I* satisfies (xi).
1
We omit the straightforward check that 1* satisfies (2. xE vE I. N-E vE 1.
i.e., (a) of (xii) holds for I.
• In the same manner (a) of (xii) holds for I i and (b) of (xii) holds for both Ii I (c) is independent of the information pattern and depends only on x and y . To sum up, (a), (b), (c) of (xii) are satisfied for x , y , and i in both r , r . Then by (xii),
(e*) x E ~ I i-y E T i .
Let x E w* E I , w= w n ~ for w E I , E .
Then x E w and from (d*), y E w Similarly, y E Hence y E w* . In the same way, y E w* x E w* . This proves that condition (xii) is also 
A Variation on the Theme
The condition (xii) is fairly stringent. Each player has no informational influence on others, not even on a null set. on the other hand absolutely no assumption was made on the payoff functions in proving for all 2 > 0;
In the light of (xiii) and (xiv) we weaken (xii) to: From the construction, it is clear that
Therefore, by (xiv), we have h i(oIrT)) : hi(Z( i)) . That is,
. This is a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
If ( The careful reader must have noticed that we have defined a Nash Equilibrium by requiring that all 1 --as opposed to "almost all"--players must be optimal in accordance with (2.11). This is because, in our opinion, the very basis of an N.E. is individual optimization, and ignoring even a single player would go against the grain of this notion. i.e., the payoff to any player depends on his strategy and the measurable function of others strategies modulo null sets.
Consider an infinite repetition ro of r , in which each player 1 That is why the "almost all" variations of assumptions (xii) and (xii)*, (xiii), (iv) would not suffice for our results. 2 For a further discussion of this topic see 14].
can observe at each stage the entire past history of (a) his own moves and payoffs, (b) the measurable functions of others' moves, modulo null sets. The payoffs to plays in r are assigned by some rule (e.g., lim inf , discounted surn)...it doesn't much matter. Then F satisfies (xii), (xii)* (and, also, of course (i)-(xi), (xiii), (xiv)).
Consider the game r C obtained by coarsening r as shown in Figure 8 i.e., each player observes nothing at the end of any stage in Note that (7.1) implies that not only N , but also players' moves and the length of the game are all finite. However o the restriction that N is finite, is substantial, all the others are made for nota-" * tional convenience.
iAssuming this will always exist, e.g. by requiring that the payoffs are uniformly bounded in r.
The idea behind going from r to r is roughly as follows.
Consider the game r' where fai a Bta aetemvso
1, 2. The behavioral strategies of 1, 2 are the sets
Construct the game as follows:
FIGURE 10
At of i in r . Then the pure strategies of f correspond exactly to the behavioral strategies of r . We now extend this picture to the general case (assuming (7.1), (7.2)).
A behavioral strategy b i of player i is a function on X i which assigns to each x E X i a probability distribution bi (x) on . This is sufficient for the current purpose.
It can be easily checked that if To interpret (iv') first note that: 
S(a 6
;.-: {1,2 )
FIGURE 11
The conditions (7.5) and (7.7) are met at these strategies. Therefore if the outcome is Nash in the refined game it will also be Nash in the coarsening.
Next consider Proposition 2.1 for r , r Condition (iii) of Proposition 2.1 says (in the context of r ) that for all i E N B x, y E (bc) n X i for some c i E B. e ~~~-7n-7 u -I l.n .,4 L .
